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A Note on Job Mobility Among Workers
with Disabilities
MARJORIE L. BALDWIN and EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER*
This article uses data from the 1990 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation to analyze relationships between disability status and job
mobility. We identify individuals who experienced voluntary or involuntary job
separations over a 20-month period and examine the effect of disability status on
rates of job change and wage growth following a job change. The results show
that disabled workers aremore likely to experience involuntary job changes than
are nondisabled workers, but there is little difference in the wage effects of job
changes by disability status.
In the years following passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), complaints of employment and wage discrimin-
ation against workers with disabilities increased rapidly. There is no empirical
evidence, however, documenting differences in the rates of job separations
between disabled and nondisabled workers.
This article uses data from the 1990 and 1993 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to analyze relationships between
disability status, job changes, and wages. We track employment histories
across six waves of data to identify individuals who experienced a job
separation during a 20-month period. The data are rich enough to distinguish
between voluntary (worker-initiated) and involuntary (employer-initiated)
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job separations. Using the SIPP data, we compare the relative job mobility of
disabled and nondisabled workers across four dimensions.
Workers with disabilities are expected to have higher rates of involuntary
job changes than do nondisabled workers. Employers generally face greater
uncertainties in hiring decisions involving disabled workers than in
decisions regarding nondisabled workers. If employers underestimate the
effects of functional limitations on worker productivity, this may lead to a
higher rate of job terminations for the disabled group. Finding a good job
match is also difficult for workers with disabilities. Once a good match has
been found (in terms of job accommodations, nonwage benefits, etc.), a
disabled worker may be reluctant to leave voluntarily, leading to a higher
proportion of involuntary job separations among workers with disabilities.
Finally, discriminatory employers may regard workers with disabilities as
marginal workers who are ‘‘last hired, first fired.’’
The effect of disability on rates of voluntary job changes is unknown.
Functional limitations or the fear of losing health insurance may constrain
the mobility of disabled workers, making it difficult or impossible to search
for a new job. Discrimination by employers, employees, or customers of
other firms may reduce the number of incoming wage offers to disabled
workers, also reducing their prospects for voluntary job changes. On the
other hand, disabled workers, as well as employers, face uncertainties in
evaluating the effects of functional limitations on productivity. If workers
initially overestimate their functional capacities, conditional on their
impairments, this may lead to higher rates of voluntary turnover. Disabled
workers also have potential alternative sources of income (SSDI and SSI)
that are unavailable to nondisabled workers and lower the expected costs of
job separations, thereby increasing expected turnover rates.
Wage growth following an involuntary job change could be greater or smaller
for workers with disabilities than for nondisabled workers. Disabled workers
have a lower probability of receiving high wage offers than do nondisabled
workers because of employer discrimination and difficulties in searching for
new jobs, so their postdisplacement wage losses may be greater. On the other
hand, disabled workers have sources of income unavailable to nondisabled
workers (disability pensions, SSDI, andSSI), so thosewho remain in the labor
market may be a selected sample with the highest wage offers.
Likewise, the effect of disability on wage growth following a voluntary job
change is an empirical question. Disabled workers are expected to receive
lower wage offers than nondisabled workers because of discrimination,
limitations on job search and difficulties in evaluating the effects of
functional limitations on productivity. In addition, disabled workers may be
forced to leave higher-paid jobs because they have overestimated their
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productivity or are no longer able to perform the required tasks. Both
hypotheses suggest that wage growth will be slower following a voluntary
job change for disabled workers than for nondisabled workers. On the other
hand, disabled workers may demand relatively high wage offers before they
are willing to make a voluntary job change to compensate for greater
uncertainty in finding a good match. These selection effects would cause us
to observe faster wage growth among disabled workers because only those
workers with the highest wage offers change jobs voluntarily.
Data and Methods
We provide empirical evidence on job mobility and wage growth by
disability status using data from the 1990 and 1993 panels of the SIPP. Each
wave, or interview, refers to a 4-month reference period. We use wave 3 as
the start point for the study because it includes questions about functional
limitations and disability status. Persons are considered disabled if they
indicate that a health condition ‘‘limits their ability to work at a job or
around the house’’ or ‘‘limits their mobility or ability to communicate.’’
The sample is restricted to persons aged 16 to 65 years who are employed
during the final month of the wave 3 reference period (hereafter called the
start date) and have continuous data on employment and earnings through
wave 8 (a 20-month period). After exclusions, there are 1445 (1293) disabled
and 15,982 (12,734) nondisabled persons in the 1990 (1993) sample.1
Workers who experience a job change at any time in the 20-month
observation period are classified as job changers; workers who do not
experience a job change are classified as job stayers. Job changers are further
classified as voluntary changers, those who leave their job for a new job,
retirement, or other unspecified reasons and involuntary changers, those who
are laid off, discharged, or work in a temporary job that ended.2
1Excluded are self-employed persons, persons who receive Social Security disability benefits (because
the program places restrictions on their labor market participation), and persons in the armed forces or
construction occupations (because job changes are difficult to define in these occupations). In the 1990
panel, 75 percent of eligible workers at the start date in wave 3 have complete data through wave 8 (70
percent of disabled workers, 75 percent of nondisabled workers); in the 1993 panel, 72 percent have
complete data through wave 8 (68 percent of disabled workers, 73 percent of nondisabled workers).
2There may be misclassification errors because some disabled workers report an involuntary layoff
when they are actually quitting for noneconomic reasons or because some disabled workers report a
separation for ‘‘other’’ (health) reasons when they are actually being terminated. Such errors in reporting
may occur among nondisabled workers as well.
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Job-Change Model. We estimate a multinomial logit model of the
decision to change jobs to analyze the relative mobility of disabled and
nondisabled workers. The dependent variable classifies workers as volun-
tary job changers, involuntary job changers, or job stayers.
Independent variables in the model control for demographic character-
istics (male, married, African-American), human capital characteristics
(education, job experience), job-related characteristics (union member, part-
time worker, public-sector worker, industry, and occupation), labor market
characteristics (metropolitan statistical area, region), and nonwage income
(total family nonwage income in the 4-month reference period preceding the
start date). The model also includes binary variables to identify workers
with disabilities and workers whose fringe benefits include employer-
provided health insurance or pension coverage (defined benefit, defined
contribution, and other type of pension). We estimate one version of the
model for the pooled sample from 1990 and 1993 (with a year dummy) and
another version separately by year.
Wage-Change Model. We estimate a variation of the model studied by
Ruhm (1991), who examined the effects of job displacement on the earnings
and employment of all workers. The equation to be estimated is
DWi ¼ Yia1i þ Cia2i þ c1Di þ c2ðDi  CiÞ þ ei ð1Þ
where DW is the change in the log wage between the start date and end date
(month 20), Y is a vector of variables measuring changes in observable
characteristics over the 20-month period with coefficient vector a1, and C is
a vector of two binary variables identifying voluntary and involuntary job
changers with coefficient vector a2. The remaining variables in the wage
equation are the disabled dummy D and the interaction terms between
disability status and the job-change variables. Variables in the vector Y
include change in experience squared, change in marital status, and change
in spouse’s employment status.
The wage-change model is estimated with the pooled sample in a model
that includes a year dummy and separately for the 2 years. The samples are
restricted to persons who are employed in both waves 3 and 8 (15,909
workers in 1990 and 13,059 in 1993).
Results
There is slightly greater job mobility among disabled workers than
among nondisabled workers and slightly greater mobility in 1990 than in
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1993. In 1990, 22 percent of disabled workers and 18 percent of nondisabled
workers left their jobs during the 20-month period. In 1993, the proportions
of job changers decreased to 20 and 16 percent. Among workers who
changed jobs, approximately 40 percent were involuntary job changers. The
proportion of involuntary changers declined between 1990 and 1993,
dropping 9 percentage points for nondisabled workers and 2 percentage
points for disabled workers.
Logit Estimates of the Job-Change Models. Table 1 presents results for
the multinomial logit models of job changes. Consistent with our prediction,
the results from the pooled sample indicate that disabled workers are signi-
ficantly more likely to make involuntary job changes than are nondisabled
workers.3 All else equal, a disabled worker is 2.7 percent more likely to
experience an involuntary job change than is a nondisabled worker relative
to the mean change rate of about 17 percent. The rate of involuntary job
changes for the entire sample is 7.1 percent, so this represents a 38 percent
increase in the rate of involuntary job changes for workers with disabilities
relative to nondisabled workers.
When the job-change model is estimated separately for 1990 and 1993, we
find that the rates of involuntary job changes are significantly higher for
disabled workers than for nondisabled workers in both years, but the effect
is stronger in 1990. In 1993, disabled workers were only 1.6 percent more
likely to experience an involuntary job change than were nondisabled
workers relative to the mean change rate of 16 percent.
The results are consistent with either the job-mismatch hypothesis
(employers have difficulty evaluating the productivity of disabled workers
and are more likely to make mistakes that lead to terminations; disabled
workers have difficulty finding good job matches and are reluctant to leave
voluntarily, leading to a higher proportion of involuntary changes) or the
discrimination hypothesis (employer prejudice against workers with dis-
abilities leads to a higher rate of job terminations). One might speculate that
the changes between 1990 and 1993 reflect the impact of the ADA. If
employers are threatened by the possibility of legal action and complaints to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), discrimination
against workers with disabilities in job terminations and layoffs should
decrease, consistent with our finding that, all else equal, the difference in
rates of involuntary job changes between disabled and nondisabled workers
3We estimated a binomial probit model with outcomes change jobs/do not change jobs with similar
results. The pooled model indicates that workers with disabilities are about 4 percent more likely to
change jobs than are nondisabled workers. Results are available from the authors.
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declined over the period. However, we stratified our samples of disabled
workers into groups with conditions subject to more and less prejudice and
found no evidence that the rates of involuntary job changes were positively
correlated with prejudice, as the discrimination hypothesis would suggest.4
There is no statistical difference in the probability of disabled or
nondisabled workers making voluntary job changes in the pooled job-change
model or in the model estimated with data from 1990, but in 1993 disabled
workers were significantly more likely than nondisabled workers to make
voluntary job changes. All else equal, a disabled worker is 1.1 percent more
likely to make a voluntary job change relative to the mean change rate of 16
percent. The rate of voluntary job changes in the 1993 sample is 10 percent, so
this represents an 11 percent increase in the rate for disabled workers.
The fact that we found no significant differences in the rates of voluntary
turnover in two of our three models is not surprising because the predicted
relationship between disability status and voluntary job changes is
ambiguous. Limitations on job search, fear of losing health insurance,
and discrimination by potential new employers are expected to reduce the
rate of voluntary turnover among disabled workers relative to nondisabled
workers. On the other hand, job mismatch and the availability of disability
benefit programs are expected to increase the rate of voluntary turnover
among disabled workers.5
The significantly higher rate of voluntary turnover for disabled workers
in 1993 suggests that something changed in the labor market for workers
with disabilities over the period. One obvious explanation is that the
antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA created opportunities for
disabled workers to move voluntarily to better jobs. Another explanation
4See Royal and Roberts (1987) and Westbrook, Legge, and Pennay (1993) for rankings of negative
attitudes (prejudice) toward persons with different health conditions. Baldwin and Johnson (2000) report
larger unexplained wage differentials between nondisabled workers and workers with health conditions
subject to more prejudice (MP) than between nondisabled workers and workers with conditions subject
to less prejudice (LP). Their results support the hypothesis that workers with disabilities are subject to
employer wage discrimination. Following Baldwin and Johnson (2000), we stratified our samples of
workers with disabilities into LP and MP groups and reestimated the pooled job-change model with
dummies for each group. Contrary to the discrimination hypothesis, the results show that LP workers
have a significantly higher probability of involuntary job changes than do nondisabled workers, but
there is no significant difference between the probabilities of involuntary changes for the nondisabled and
MP groups.
5According to the job-match hypothesis, disabled workers will search longer, on average, to find good
job matches and may change jobs often, at first, until a good match is found. After a match is found,
disabled workers are less likely to change jobs voluntarily. This implies that voluntary job changes
should decrease faster with job tenure for the disabled. To test this prediction, we reestimated the job-
change model with an interaction term between job experience and disability status. The coefficient of the
interaction term was not significant, so we found no specific evidence to support the job-match story in
our data.
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TABLE 1
Multinomial Logit Analysis of Reasons for Job Changes
Variablesa
1990 and 1993b 1990 Onlyb 1993 Onlyb
Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
ðN ¼ 3263Þ ðN ¼ 2222Þ ðN ¼ 1811Þ ðN ¼ 1427Þ ðN ¼ 1452Þ ðN ¼ 795Þ
Disabled 0.131 0:356** 0:144 0:327** 0:301* 0:234*
(0.101) (0.088) (0.101) (0.089) (0.119) (0.098)
[0.005] [0.027] [0.007] [0.025] [0.011] [0.016]
Health insurance 0:584** 0:417** 0:599** 0:540** 0:578** 0:327**
(0.054) (0.046) (0.069) (0.064) (0.089) (0.069)
[0.028] [0:030] [0:034] [0:039] [0:021] [0:022]
Pension coverage 0:927** 0:831** 0:654** 0:378** 1:388** 1:373**
(0.060) (0.050) (0.075) (0.068) (0.104) (0.077)
[0:043] [0:060] [0:038] [0:026] [0:048] [0:095]
Job experience 0:048** 0:019** 0:051** 0:026* 0:044** 0:014**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Male 0.204** 0.158** 0.151* 0.195** 0.297** 0.107
(0.053) (0.044) (0.066) (0.060) (0.087) (0.066)
[0.011] [0:013] [0.010] [0:016] [0.011] [0:009]
Education 0:011 0:024** 0:015 0.010 0.003 0:045**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014)
[0:001] [0.002] [0:001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003]
Black 0:056 0:455** 0:025 0:581** 0:124 0:244
(0.086) (0.084) (0.103) (0.112) (0.161) (0.128)
[0:001] [0:035] [0.002] [0:045] [0:004] [0:017]
MSA > 100;000 0:080 0:047 0:116 0:052 0:005 0:041
(0.049) (0.042) (0.062) (0.056) (0.082) (0.062)
[0:004] [0:003] [0:007] [0:003] [0:000] [0:003]
Part time 0:127* 0:045 0:202* 0:041 0:003 0:048
(0.064) (0.051) (0.083) (0.069) (0.102) (0.078)
[0.006] [0:003] [0:012] [0:002] [0:000] [0:003]
Union member 0.056 0:148* 0:008 0:336** 0.177 0.044
(0.073) (0.068) (0.091) (0.093) (0.127) (0.101)
[0.004] [0:012] [0.001] [0:026] [0.007] [0.003]
Married 0:232** 0:056 0:180** 0:053 0:313** 0:053
(0.052) (0.045) (0.065) (0.060) (0.087) (0.068)
[0:012] [0:003] [0:011] [0:003] [0:012] [0:003]
Year 1993 0:383** 0.026 — — — —
(0.051) (0.041)
[0:020] [0.004]
aOther variables included in the equation are three regional dummies (representing four regions), publicsector employment, family income, eleven industry dummies, and five
occupation dummies. The pooled (1990–1993) model also includes an interaction term between disability status and year. The omitted group is job stayers.
bStandard errors are shown in parentheses; marginal effects in brackets. In 1990, there are 1126 (13,063) job stayers, 186 (1625) voluntary changers, and 133 (1294) involuntary
changers in the disabled (nondisabled) sample. In 1993, there are 1035 (10,745) job stayers, 155 (1297) voluntary changers, and 103 (692) involuntary changers in the disabled
(nondisabled) sample. Means for independent variables are available from the authors.
*Significance at the 0.05 level or better.
**Significance at the 0.01 level or better.
Source: SIPP, 1990 and 1993 (waves III–VIII).
is that increasing numbers of disabled workers left the job market to enter
the disability rolls. Between 1991 and 1993, the average annual rate of
increase in numbers of SSDI beneficiaries was 7.4 percent, compared with
an average annual rate of increase of 2.6 percent between 1988 and 1990
(Social Security Administration 2001). The change in relative rates of
voluntary turnover observed in our data is consistent with the story that
after 1990, increasing numbers of more severely disabled workers left paid
employment to apply for disability transfer programs, where they perceived
the acceptance standards to be relaxed.
Compared with nondisabled workers, a smaller proportion of disabled
workers were employed after leaving their jobs. In the 1993 sample, only 55
percent of voluntary job changers with disabilities reported positive wages in
all subsequent waves, compared with 66 percent of those without disabil-
ities. This suggests that a higher proportion of disabled workers exited the
labor force after a voluntary job change (perhaps to apply for disability
benefits) or that disabled workers had greater difficulty finding new jobs.6
OLS Estimates of the Wage-Change Model. Table 2 displays coefficients
from the wage-change model. The results show no significant overall dif-
ference in wage growth between disabled and nondisabled workers over the
20-month period in either the pooled or disaggregated equations.
In general, job changes have a negative impact on wage growth. In the
pooled model, wage growth is slower for both voluntary and involuntary
job changers than for job stayers, but the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient is greater, in absolute value, for involuntary job changers.
There is no clear prediction regarding the relationship between disability
status and wage growth following a job change. In the empirical results, the
coefficient of the interaction term between disability status and involuntary
job changes is unstable across years and only significant in 1993. The
magnitude of the estimated coefficient is counterintuitive, suggesting that
disabled workers who make involuntary job changes have faster wage
growth than job stayers with disabilities. We view the 1993 results with
caution, however, because the sample size is extremely small (only 72
6Coefficients of other explanatory variables in the job-change model suggest that women and African-
Americans experience somewhat different patterns of job mobility relative to the corresponding majority
group than do disabled workers. Both women and disabled workers have relatively high rates of
involuntary job changes, whereas African-Americans have significantly lower rates of involuntary
changes than do whites. Most important, the patterns of job mobility for women and African-Americans
were stable between 1990 and 1993, suggesting that something unique occurred in the labor market for
workers with disabilities to increase their rate of voluntary turnover over the same time span.
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involuntary job changers with disabilities), and the sign and significance
levels are not robust across different specifications of the model.
In the case of voluntary job changes, the empirical estimates provide
some evidence that wage growth is slower for disabled workers than for
nondisabled workers. In the 1993 sample, wage growth following a
voluntary job change was 13.3 percent slower for disabled workers than
for nondisabled workers. The results are consistent with the hypotheses that
disabled workers receive lower wage offers than do nondisabled workers
either because of discrimination or limitations on job search or because
disabled workers are more likely to leave jobs voluntarily because they have
overestimated their productivity.
It is unclear why the negative effects of disability on wage growth
following a voluntary job change appear only in 1993, when the ADA was
expected to reduce discrimination and open new opportunities for workers
TABLE 2
Wage Change Effects of Job Changes and Disability Status
Pooledb 1990b 1993b
Variablesa ðN ¼ 28; 968Þ ðN ¼ 15; 910Þ ðN ¼ 13; 059Þ
Disabled 0:000 0:004 0:004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Voluntary 0:027** 0:046** 0:013
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Voluntary* disabled 0:059 0.006 0:133**
(0.032) (0.044) (0.048)
Involuntary 0:049** 0:058** 0:034
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Involuntary* disabled 0.040 0:019 0:116*
(0.037) (0.049) (0.058)
Change in marital status 0:052** 0:046** 0:058**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Change in spouse’s 0:004 0:005 0:002
employment status (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Year 1993 0:087** – –
(0.005)
aThe dependent variable in the regressions is the change in log real wages between the start and end dates, where the
end date is 20 months after the first interview. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are available from
the authors.
bStandard errors are shown in parentheses. In 1990, there are 1011 (12,447) job stayers, 119 (1256) voluntary changers,
and 96 (980) involuntary changers in the disabled (non-disabled) sample. In 1993, there are 948 (10,328) job stayers,
107 (1040) voluntary changers, and 72 (564) involuntary changers in the disabled (nondisabled) sample.
*Significance at the 0.05 level or better.
**Significance at the 0.01 level or better.
Source: SIPP, 1990 and 1993 (waves III–VIII).
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with disabilities. The ADA could, however, lead to a higher rate of
voluntary turnover under the job-mismatch hypothesis if the ADA gives
disabled workers the opportunity to compete for more demanding jobs than
would have been open to them in the past. While many disabled workers
will be able to meet the increased demands, particularly with reasonable
accommodations, it is also likely that more mistakes will be made and that
some disabled workers will depart voluntarily for less demanding jobs.
Summary and Discussion
The most pronounced difference in patterns of job mobility between
disabled and nondisabled workers is the higher rate of involuntary turnover
among disabled workers. The finding is consistent with the theory that
disabled workers, like other minority groups, comprise a secondary labor
force that is last hired and first fired. This, together with the strong negative
attitudes documented against specific health conditions and the relatively
high proportion of charges of discrimination in job terminations filed under
the ADA (Moss et al. 1999), might lead one to conclude that discrimination
accounts for the higher rates of involuntary turnover among disabled
workers. Our empirical test comparing turnover rates for workers with
health conditions subject to different degrees of prejudice does not support
the discrimination hypothesis, however. The higher rates of involuntary
turnover among disabled workers are also consistent with a job-mismatch
hypothesis if we assume that turnover results from poor job matches and
that employers and workers have greater difficulty making good matches
when a worker is disabled.
We find only weak evidence of differences in the wage effects of job
changes between disabled and nondisabled workers. The findings are
consistent with previous studies of wage discrimination concluding that low
employment rates are a more serious problem than low wages for workers
with disabilities (Baldwin and Johnson 1994, 1995, 2000). The results of this
study, together with previous research and data on charges filed with the
EEOC, suggest that disability advocates should focus on the dual problems
of gaining access to employment and retaining employment in their efforts to
obtain equal opportunities for disabled persons in the labor market.
The relatively small differences in mobility patterns and associated wage
changes between disabled and nondisabled workers are not so surprising as
they may first appear. Our sample is restricted to persons who are able to
find employment, so we are omitting the most severely disabled persons
from the analysis. The results suggest that, conditional on being able to
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work and being able to find a job, there are relatively few significant
differences in job mobility patterns between disabled and nondisabled
workers. It is highly likely that the real difficulty for disabled workers occurs
in the initial employment search. Once employed, disabled workers are not
so different from nondisabled workers.
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